Interview : Allan Meltzer by Aaron Steelman
public interest to say, if you want to be big, you must hold
more reserves so that you will be forced to bear a loss if you
make a mistake. We cannot continue to have a system where
profits are privatized and losses are socialized.
I should point out that much of this is in Walter Bagehot,
of course, who was an early rational expectationist. He said
that if central banks are going to lend, they should do so at a
penalty rate against good collateral and that this policy
should be made well-known in advance of a crisis. That 
system worked for the better part of the century. There were
banking problems and failures along the way, but they never
spread. The reason was bankers knew they had to hold 
collateral to protect themselves, and so they did. We have
abandoned that system, to our detriment.
RF: In addition to addressing the too big to fail problem,
what other current policy issues do you think are partic-
ularly important?
Meltzer:  There are quite a few.
One of the most important ones is
to get rid of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. The only thing they
do is to subsidize mortgages. We
should put that subsidy on the
budget. That’s where it belongs.
Having Fannie and Freddie do this
encourages corruption and encourages excessive zeal to help
particular parts of the housing system. 
I also would make the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) applicable to all
financial institutions. The purpose was to have structured
early intervention — that is, to close down commercial
banks before they used all of their capital. Then, the share-
holders could be made to bear the losses and the institution
could be sold. FDICIA was supposed to do that, but the 
regulators haven’t followed through effectively. They 
should — and FDICIA should be extended to investment
banks as well. 
The next one is less of a specific policy proposal and more
of a general recommendation. We should pay more attention
to the fat tails in the distribution of risk. What are those fat
tails? Things like the Russian default, the failure of Long
Term Capital Management, the enormous climb in housing
prices. Our current models of risk distribution — and how
they can affect the economy — don’t take adequate account
of them.
RF: What do you think of the idea of establishing a 
systemic risk regulator?
Meltzer: The administration’s proposal to make the Fed a
super-regulatory body is a mistake for two reasons. The first
is the Fed has a poor record of anticipating crises. The 
second is it would further remove responsibility from the
banks. Aregulator of last resort would worsen the too big to
fail problem.
I believe there are a few relatively straightforward rules
of regulation. First, regulation is written by lawyers and
bureaucrats, and over time markets learn to circumvent reg-
ulation. The Basel Accord is a great example of that. Banks
were supposed to hold more capital in order to take on more
risk. But, instead, they took those risks off their balance
sheets and didn’t hold more capital. In that case, both the
regulation and the circumvention failed. Regulation Q of the
Glass-Steagall Act, which prevented banks from paying
interest on demand deposits, is another good example. We
wouldn’t have money market funds if it weren’t for
Regulation Q. There are lots of examples of markets circum-
venting regulation — and not only in banking and finance.
The second rule is that regulation can be beneficial when
private costs and social costs are
not aligned. For instance, there is
arguably a good case for regulation
of banks if you have deposit insur-
ance — otherwise, banks might
take excessive risk knowing that
they will not bear the full costs
associated with a failure. The third
is that if regulations are not 
circumvented, the reason is
because they are either beneficial or they are enforced with
Draconian measures. 
RF: Looking at the Fed’s actions over the past year or so,
how well do you think it has done handling the crisis
once it was upon us?
Meltzer:In the history of the Federal Reserve System, there
are three enormous mistakes, in my opinion. The first one
was the Great Depression, of course. The second one was
the Great Inflation of the 1970s. And the third one was the
failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As I said, in
principle, I’m in favor of permitting institutions to fail when
they have acted incautiously and are insolvent as a result.
But this was a failure that occurred after 30 years of bailing
out just about every institution of any size, with no prior
announcement that the policy had changed. Suddenly the
Fed changed what had been the standard procedure and
allowed a big firm to fail. That was a mistake. It created
uncertainty in financial markets. And then, of course, the
Fed changed course shortly afterward, back to its long-
established policy of bailing out institutions. 
RF: So would you have recommended allowing Bear
Stearns to fail in March 2008? That possibly could have
sent a signal to the market that policy had changed 
and, as a result, the failure of Lehman later in the year 
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Allan Meltzer has long been one of the most prominent
monetary economists and historians, contributing 
significantly to our knowledge of how to achieve price
stability and economic growth through his academic
work, his role as a policy adviser, and his popular 
writings. In 2004, he published the first volume of his
history of the Federal Reserve System, which covered
the period from the Fed’s founding to its accord with 
the Treasury Department in 1951. The long-awaited 
second volume of his history will appear in two parts
this autumn.
Since 1957, Meltzer has taught at Carnegie Mellon
University (then known as the Carnegie Institute of
Technology). He co-founded the Carnegie-Rochester
Conference on Political Economy, where scholars 
from academia, government, and business present
papers on important public policy issues, and the
Shadow Open Market Committee, which comments
upon the policies of the Federal Reserve. He also served
as an acting member of the Council of Economic
Advisers during the Reagan administration and was
chair of the International Financial Institution 
Advisory Commission, better known as the “Meltzer
Commission,” during the 1990s. In addition, Meltzer is
a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research in Washington, D.C.
Meltzer has been quite critical of the Federal Reserve’s
actions immediately preceding and during the financial
crisis. In his view, the failure of the Federal Reserve and
other agencies to curb the assumption that some insti-
tutions were “too big to fail” played a major role in
fueling the crisis. In addition, he believes that many 
of the Fed’s lending programs, initiated since the crisis
began, were misguided, threatening the Fed’s indepen-
dence and risking its ability to control inflation over the
long run.
Aaron Steelman interviewed Meltzer at his office at
Carnegie Mellon on May 7, 2009. 
RF: What’s the status of the second volume of your 
history of the Federal Reserve?
Meltzer: I just completed the last pages of the manuscript.
The book will appear in October in two parts. I got a 
number of comments from readers, but the main comment
was that the book is 1,400 pages long and we don’t print
1,400-page books. So we ended up dividing it into two 
volumes: 2.1 and 2.2, which will come out simultaneously.
RF: Chronologically, how far did you go with the second
volume?
Meltzer: The second volume goes to 1986. I chose 1986
because it was pretty clear by then that rampant inflation
was over and that expected inflation was low. I have some
comments about the current episode, but the editor asked
me to include those as an epilogue. The most important
message of the epilogue is that you won’t get rid of crises
until you get rid of “too big to fail.” 
RF: What do you think could reasonably be done to
reduce the scope of the federal financial safety net?
Meltzer: How would I get rid of too big to fail? I would have
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RF_SPRING_2009  9/3/09  3:22 PM  Page 33around. Capitalism has spread from western Europe and
North America to the rest of the world. Now, why is that?
It’s the only system man has come up with that provides
both freedom and growth. No other system does as well. All
of the other systems are generally someone’s idea of utopia.
But it’s not everyone’s idea of utopia. And when people look
at the recent crisis and say that the market failed, they 
are not getting to the right issue. The market didn’t fail.
What failed were the incentives that we — human beings —
created. At the top of that list is too big to fail. 
RF: How did you and Karl Brunner come up with the
idea of creating the Shadow Open
Market Committee and what were
your goals for it? 
Meltzer:We did that at a time when
wage and price controls recently had
been adopted. Karl and I organized
about a dozen economists to sign a
statement that we published in the
Wall Street Journal saying that the
controls were a bad idea and would
not work. To get that statement 
written — this was before fax
machines and personal computers —
we had to spend hours on the telephone. Any time we had to
make a change to accommodate somebody, we had to call
the others and tell them what the change was. Obviously
that was not a very good way to do things. We decided that
we needed to have a meeting.
What was our objective? Karl and I were both disturbed
— I knew I was very disturbed — because of the way the
problem of inflation was being discussed generally. For
instance, there was a lot of talk that we either needed to go
back to the gold standard on the one hand or that inflation
wasn’t really anything to worry about on the other. We 
didn’t think these views represented anything close to the
consensus of the good academic work that was being done
then. So we put together a group of both business and aca-
demic economists, and we tried to inform people and build
a constituency for a quite different policy. That’s how we
started. And we were fortunate in that the New York Times,
W ashington Post, and W all Street Journal all gave that first
meeting a lot of attention. So we were well-launched. The
committee has continued to meet since then — although I
left in 1990 — and I think it has enjoyed some success in
pushing the debate about inflation in the correct direction. 
RF: What was the Meltzer Commission? What was its
purpose? And which conclusions did it arrive at?
Meltzer: The Commission got started mainly because in
1998 some members of Congress were not in favor of 
continued funding of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). They agreed to vote for funding if the president
would agree to have a commission to study the effectiveness
of the IMF and similar organizations. So that’s how it got
started. Its official name was the International Financial
Institution Advisory Commission but became known as the
Meltzer Commission because I chaired it. (I was not, by 
the way, the first choice to chair it. Originally, I was just 
supposed to be a member, but a couple of other people could
not do it, so I wound up taking it on.) I requested papers 
on a number of topics and the people who had worked on
them would explain to the other Commission members
what the relevant issues were. 
For example, I knew very little 
about the Bank for International
Settlements — what it did or
whether it was a good thing. We
eventually issued a report with a
series of recommendations. 
The major recommendation
that we made regarding the IMF
was that it needed to be more 
discriminating in allocating
funds. If countries adopt good
policies, the IMF should consider
helping them. If they don’t, it
should not. Also, the loans that are issued should be issued at
a penalty rate. That gives countries a strong incentive to pur-
sue wise policies and avoid the need for IMF assistance in
the first place. The banks were a much harder problem
because their record of accomplishment is very poor. Many
countries that have received significant funding from them
have not fared very well. Meanwhile, others that have gotten 
relatively little funding — such as China — have seen 
millions of their citizens lifted out of poverty as they 
have liberalized and adopted more market-oriented policies,
something that the World Bank does not do a good job of
encouraging. 
The report didn’t say this, but I think the World Bank
should close. What the report said instead is that there
should be an independent audit to find out which programs
work and which do not. Then it could either improve the
ones that don’t work or get rid of them. The World Bank is
full of people who want to do good things for the poor peo-
ple of the world. But they don’t understand which things will
help them and which things won’t. They do not generally
appreciate that the only system that produces growth and
freedom is capitalism. Also, they have no follow-up on their
programs. Their whole system is geared to the idea that a
program is successful once the final set of funds has been 
discharged. So if they’re building schools in Africa, when the
school is built, they declare it a success. But they don’t know
whether there’s a road to connect to the school, how many
kids go to the school, or if they are learning anything. 
wouldn’t have come as such a 
surprise. 
Meltzer: I don’t think you change
policy in a crisis. That is likely to
make things worse. At the same time,
I don’t think the Fed should have
engaged in many of the fiscal actions
it has taken. I believe that the Fed
has sacrificed its independence. It
hasn’t always been independent, but
Volcker and, to some extent,
Greenspan built up independence
for the institution. That has been
squandered in the current crisis. The
Fed has become a financing arm of
the Treasury Department. Now that
it has alerted Congress that it is will-
ing to go along with just about
anything, it is going to have a hard
time digging its way out. 
RF: Do you think the recent
actions of the Fed have reduced 
its credibility as an inflation 
fighter and that it will have more
difficulty pursuing policies consis-
tent with price stability when the
economy rebounds? 
Meltzer: Yes. I’ve had this discussion with members of the
Board of Governors and some members of the Fed’s staff.
They argue that the lending programs have been structured
in a way that will permit them to remove liquidity from the
system when needed. I have no doubt, as I’ve told them,
about their technical ability to do that. It’s the political
problem. I just don’t see them overcoming the political
problem. Where will the political problem come from?
Probably Congress and the administration, but also the busi-
ness community. They’re going to say, “The economy is just
beginning to recover. And you’re going to tighten policy
now?” It’s not going to be an easy sell. 
Consider monetary policy during the 1970s. The people
at the Fed were not idiots. They knew what they were doing.
They would swear to themselves that they were not going to
let inflation get out of line. But then the unemployment rate
rose, and all of that went out the window. They expanded the
money supply rapidly. 
Volcker was finally able to put a stop to it for two reasons.
First, by then inflation had become such a problem that
everyone knew something had to be done about it; there was
considerably more popular and political support for taking 
a hard line against inflation. Second, he demonstrated 
enormous courage when the tightening was accompanied by
very high and rising unemployment.  
In January 1982, when the reces-
sion was at its worst point and new
construction had basically stopped,
Volcker gave a talk to a home
builders association. Basically, he
told them, “I know you’re hurting,
but you have to understand, if we
don’t do this now and finish it, we’re
going to have to do it again and it
will be even harder the next time
because we gave up on this one.”
They gave him a standing ovation,
not because they admired his policy
but because they admired his
courage. He kept raising rates when
everyone thought he would not have
the will to do so. For instance, I
recall Jim Tobin saying that it would
take 10 years to get rid of inflation,
when in fact it took much less time.
RF: Do you believe that the Fed
was too easy for too long follow-
ing the recession of 2001?
Meltzer:  Well that’s one where I
have some scars. I was a visitor at
the Fed in 2003. Alan Greenspan
invited me down to talk to him about deflation, which he
was quite concerned about at the time. He had read and
commented on the first volume of my book and had some
questions. I told him that there had been six periods of
deflation in Federal Reserve history that didn’t hurt any-
thing and one that did, the Great Depression. I told him
that I did not think the evidence suggested that deflation —
especially a harmful deflation — was likely. For instance, I
pointed out that countries that have large budget deficits,
active money growth, and the probability of a declining
exchange rate are very unlikely to experience deflation. So I
was very much opposed to the policy at that point and tried
to talk him into adopting a more restrained policy. But I was
not able to persuade him. Having said that, let me also say
that while I think the blame he gets for that is correct, 
I think that it’s been overdone. He didn’t tell the bankers to
use that money to buy bad mortgages. 
RF: Many commentators — and even some economists
— have argued that the financial crisis was the result of
a fundamental failure of the market system. What is
your opinion of that claim?
Meltzer: I have had several journalists call to ask me about
that issue. I think the answer is obviously no. Just look
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to talk him into adopting a more restrained policy. But I was
not able to persuade him. Having said that, let me also say
that while I think the blame he gets for that is correct, 
I think that it’s been overdone. He didn’t tell the bankers to
use that money to buy bad mortgages. 
RF: Many commentators — and even some economists
— have argued that the financial crisis was the result of
a fundamental failure of the market system. What is
your opinion of that claim?
Meltzer: I have had several journalists call to ask me about
that issue. I think the answer is obviously no. Just look
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The World Bank is full of
people who want to do good
things for the poor people
of the world. But they don’t
understand which things
will help them and which
things won’t.Recently, there has been interest in pushing for better
evaluations of the World Bank and the African
Development Bank, and that’s a very positive development.
So I think we’re having some sort of slow, long-term effect
on the banks. But I believe they need to move faster in
telling countries that if you want to grow, open up to the
world market.
RF: During the late 1970s and early 1980s, you did quite
a bit of work on public choice questions. In particular,
you and Scott Richard published an influential paper in
the Journal of Political Economy titled “A Rational
Theory of the Size of Government.” What were the
principal arguments of that paper?
Meltzer:I think that paper has probably gotten more atten-
tion by other academics than any paper I have ever written,
including my work on money, which has been the focus 
of most of my professional life. The paper says that the 
principal factor determining the size of government is 
the distribution of income. In a system of majority rule, the
voter with median income — not necessarily median 
ideological views — is decisive. Voters with income above
the median favor lower taxes and less redistribution, while
those with income below the median favor higher taxes and 
more redistribution. There are shocks, both political and 
economic, that can change the position of the median voter
and, as a result, public policy. For instance, the expansion of
the right to vote in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
greatly increased the number of voters with low income,
shifting the decisive voter down the income distribution.
This, we argue, was one of the big reasons why taxes and 
government grew during the 20th century. 
Scott Richard and I wrote another paper on how redis-
tribution is actually carried out in the United States.
Specifically, we wanted to explain why we have never 
adopted the negative income tax, despite it being a popular
idea with economists and arguably the most efficient way to
transfer resources to poor people. The answer we gave is that
the decisive voter believes the amount that people work can
be increased by giving in-kind benefits rather than cash 
benefits. If you look at the welfare system, for example, the
major cash benefits are issued in the form of unemployment
compensation and pensions to senior citizens. In short,
those benefits go to people who have worked. But for those
who do not work or have not worked, we give food stamps,
housing subsidies, and a variety of other transfers — but we
don’t give cash. And even when we have something that’s a
modified version of the negative income tax, such as the
earned income tax credit, it goes to people who work. 
RF: You have served in the government on a couple of
occasions. Do you think that policymakers pay much
attention to the advice they solicit?
Meltzer: It very much depends on the politician. For 
example, Nixon didn’t care much about economics. He 
really relied on George Shultz to a considerable extent. As
budget director, George got to learn what Nixon’s priorities
and preferences were and he made a lot of the decisions
based on that, without consulting Nixon on specific ques-
tions because Nixon simply wasn’t interested. Gerry Ford,
who I got to know quite well, was entirely different. First of
all, he knew the budget inside and out because he had been
in Congress. But he also listened to his advisers. He took
what they said into consideration and was willing to do what
he thought was right, even if it cost him some political 
support. Reagan was a slightly different case. He may not
have known the details of a piece of legislation as well as, say,
Ford. But he had strong convictions and if the goals and 
likely effects of a bill coincided with what he believed, he
would get behind it even if it was unpopular.  RF
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